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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
NO. 05-2418
________________
CAROLINE P. AYRES-FOUNTAIN,
                           Appellant
   v.
EASTERN SAVINGS BANK, a Maryland Corporation
____________________________________
On Appeal From the United States District Court
For the District of Delaware
(D.C. Civ. No. 04-cv-00439)
District Judge: Honorable Joseph J. Farnan, Jr.
_______________________________________
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
October 14, 2005
Before:   RENDELL, AMBRO and FUENTES, Circuit Judges
(Filed: October 27, 2005)
_______________________
OPINION
_______________________
PER CURIAM
Caroline Ayres-Fountain appeals the District Court’s order dismissing her
complaint.  Appellee had instituted a foreclosure action against Ayres-Fountain in the
      Ayres-Fountain argues that appellee has waived this argument.  However, we have1
an obligation to sua sponte raise the issue of subject-matter jurisdiction.  Desi’s Pizza,
Inc. v. City of Wilkes-Barre, 321 F.3d 411, 420 (3d Cir. 2003).
2
Superior Court of Delaware.  The Superior Court entered summary judgment in favor of
appellee.  Ayres-Fountain then filed a complaint in the District Court for the District of
Delaware alleging fraud by appellee and seeking recission of the mortgage note.  The
District Court concluded that her claims were barred by the doctrine of res judicata and
granted appellee’s motion to dismiss.  Ayres-Fountain filed a notice of appeal, and we
have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  
While Ayres-Fountain lists fourteen numbered issues on appeal, they can be
summarized as two basic arguments - whether res judicata applies to her complaint and
whether the District Court should have permitted her to amend her complaint.  However,
we must first address whether the District Court had jurisdiction over Ayres-Fountain’s
complaint.  Appellee argues that the District Court lacked jurisdiction under the Rooker-
Feldman doctrine.   We agree.  The Rooker-Feldman doctrine deprives a federal district1
court of jurisdiction to review, directly or indirectly, a state court adjudication.  See D.C.
Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983); Rooker v. Fid. Trust Co., 263 U.S.
413, 416 (1923).  A federal claim is barred if it is “inextricably intertwined” with the state
court adjudication.  We recently noted that
[a] federal claim is inextricably intertwined with an issue adjudicated by a state
court when . . . the federal court must take an action that would negate the state
court’s judgment . . . . Rooker-Feldman does not allow a plaintiff to seek relief
that, if granted, would prevent a state court from enforcing its orders.
3In re Knapper, 407 F.3d 573, 581 (3d Cir. 2005).  In this case, the Superior Court ordered
judgment in favor of appellee based on Ayres-Fountain’s default of the terms of the note
and mortgage.  In her complaint filed in the District Court, Ayres-Fountain sought
recission of the mortgage and damages.  Thus, the relief she seeks would invalidate the
Superior Court’s judgment against her.  Ayres-Fountain’s proposed amended complaint
would not cure this lack of jurisdiction.
Moreover, even if review of the complaint were not barred by Rooker-Feldman,
we agree with the District Court that Ayres-Fountain’s claims were barred by res judicata. 
Furthermore, we note that in the state court action, Ayres-Fountain agreed that she waived
all defenses.
For the above reasons, we will vacate the District Court’s March 31, 2005, order
and remand the matter to the District Court with instructions to dismiss the complaint for
lack of jurisdiction.  Appellant’s motion to strike appellee’s brief is denied.
